

May 16

In 1949, after much legal haggling, Los Alamos became a county, and its citizens became legal residents of New Mexico with voting privileges in local, State and national elections. In 1957, the gates came down, and anybody who wanted to could come and go in the town.

Today, except for its rugged mountain setting, the community of bright green lawns and brilliant gardens looks just about like any suburban town. Its more than 13,000 residents enjoy an outstanding school system, a fast-growing shopping facility and plenty of recreation. The housing has never caught up with the demand and often seems to be losing ground, but the big hope for improvement lies in two burgeoning subdivisions, where land and homes are being bought and built by private individuals for the first time in the history of the Federal project.

But, if Los Alamos is still not quite a "normal" community, it soon will be. Last fall, President Kennedy signed a bill making possible the shift of commercial and residential property of the Hill from Federal to private ownership. Although the long process of platting, planning and appraisal has begun, actual sales are not expected to begin before mid-1964. Meanwhile, the AEC is planning more than \$8 million worth of construction and maintenance to put municipal facilities in good, salable shape, and the busy members of the Los Alamos County Commission are tackling the monumental job of preparing the community for self-government.

Many changes have taken place on Pajarito Plateau during the past two decades. Changes which have affected not only the community itself, but changes which have altered mankind's whole outlook on the world in which he lives. But, one thing will not change: the Laboratory's adventurous spirit and the unmatched natural beauty of the setting which provides much of the inspiration for that spirit.

With an impressive record of accomplishments behind it, and its hometown becoming what the AEC hoped in 1947 would be "a community satisfactory to scientists," the Laboratory can look to a promising future.

Many technological and scientific advances are predictable—achievement of flyable nuclear rockets and investigation of more sophisticated types of nuclear rocket propulsion; practical system for obtaining power from controlled fusion; fast breeding fission reactors; explorations in the field of molecular biology. Quite unpredictable, however, are scientific and technological breakthroughs. There were plenty of these during the Laboratory's first 20 years—there are certain to be many more in the future.

THE ROLE OF OUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES DURING THE CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP: WHAT ARE THE REAL FACTS, AND WHAT CAN WE PROPERLY CONCLUDE?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. STRATTON] is recognized for 45 minutes.

(Mr. STRATTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Armed Services Committee and as a former intelligence officer in the Navy I have been gravely concerned since last January with the sweeping and serious charges that have been made against our established Government intelligence agencies in connection with their performance in the Cuban crisis. For this reason I have awaited with great interest the release of the

report of the Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the other body, summarizing its findings in its recent investigation into this whole matter.

Mr. Speaker, now that this report has been released I feel constrained to say that I find myself baffled, mystified, and disappointed by it. Last January and February we found ourselves with a violent, almost hysterical attack being made upon both the integrity and the competence of our Nation's intelligence agencies. Either they cannot find out the real facts about Cuba, we were being told, or else they are deliberately covering up. This attack became so severe and so potentially damaging that on February 6 to quiet it, the Secretary of Defense went on nationwide television for 2 hours with material that only a few hours earlier had been classified as secret or top secret—a truly unprecedented undertaking, which, incidentally, was only partially successful.

It was against this background, Mr. Speaker, that the subcommittee moved to try to find the real answer to these grave and very disturbing questions. Were the intelligence people right—or were they not? The Congress ought to know, and the people ought to know, too.

This was the task to which the distinguished subcommittee set itself.

Now the verdict is in, Mr. Speaker, and I must say I am flabbergasted to see it: All charges have been factually disproved, but somehow the defendant has still not been acquitted. Instead he remains under suspicion, if he is not indeed actually found guilty at least on some counts.

I realize that the legislative process involves compromise, but surely when it comes to a question as gravely serious as the one that originally led to the subcommittee's inquiry, do not we deserve a more specific answer than that, if the facts at all warrant such an answer?

Yet here is a jury verdict with something for everybody, a strange amalgam of both fact and fancy which comes out clearly and positively exactly nowhere.

Surely if the facts point one way, Mr. Speaker, then we have a right, do we not, to expect that the conclusions will follow them in the same direction? Surely when the integrity and the competence of our top intelligence services have been so viciously attacked, the American people have a right to expect a more specific and forthright answer from this great subcommittee.

Let us look at this report. As I see it, every single one of the grave charges made against our intelligence services last February—both on and off of the floors of Congress—have been specifically and conclusively disproved by the subcommittee's report.

Let me just run down some of their findings, mostly in their own words:

The subcommittee has uncovered no evidence to substantiate charges and speculation about a photography gap having existed from September 5 to October 14. The evidence before the subcommittee leads to the conclusion that such charges are unfounded.

The news reports of an alleged conflict between the CIA and SAC with reference to the operation of U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance flights prior to October 14 were also closely inquired into and found to be without merit.

To a man the intelligence chiefs stated that it is their opinion that all strategic missiles and bombers have been removed from Cuba.

The intelligence community estimated that approximately 5,000 Soviet personnel were withdrawn from Cuba following the October confrontation. A net of 4,000 to 5,000 additional have been withdrawn since the first of the year, our intelligence people say.

That, Mr. Speaker, is a direct quote, as are the others, from the subcommittee's own report, and that adds up to a total estimated withdrawal of from 9,000 to 10,000 Soviet personnel. The report does not mention a single word about any evidence to support the charge, made in some quarters, that a comparable number of Soviet personnel—whether called troops or technicians—have newly arrived in Cuba.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. MORSE. How many Soviet troops, according to the estimates of our intelligence sources, now remain in Cuba?

Mr. STRATTON. If the gentleman will permit me to develop my point of view as I have prepared it, I think that we can then discuss that subject a little later.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, will the gentleman agree that the presence of Soviet troops rather than the number of Soviet troops is the critical factor?

Mr. STRATTON. Well, I would say to my good friend from Massachusetts that I certainly agree with him that the presence of Soviet troops is a matter of concern, but what I am directing myself to, however, is a specific item with respect to the quality of our intelligence and with respect to certain suggestions that have been made in certain quarters that certain individuals have a different kind of intelligence from that available to our top intelligence agencies. Such a suggestion was made, for example, to the effect that as many troops or technicians, or whatever you want to call them, had moved back into Cuba in recent months as had been withdrawn earlier, and I am simply calling to the attention of the House the fact that the report of the subcommittee says that a total of 9,000 to 10,000 troops were withdrawn from Cuba since October.

And that there is not a shred of evidence in the report—I am not quoting—but there is nothing in the report to suggest that any number of troops or technicians or Soviet personnel ever went back into Cuba.

Mr. MORSE. If the gentleman will yield further, would the gentleman agree that there are still thousands of Soviet troops on the island of Cuba today?

Mr. STRATTON. Yes; and the reports substantiate that.

Mr. MORSE. Would the gentleman restate his quotation with reference to the "photography gap"?

Mr. STRATTON. Well, I do not mind debating with the gentleman, and I am always happy to talk with him, but my time is somewhat limited.

Mr. MORSE. I just missed the dates.

1963

those who shared Bradbury's faith in Los Alamos.

Their faith was confirmed often throughout the balance of 1946. In the spring, General Groves approved plans for construction of "The Hill's" first permanent housing, and prefabricated units were added as quick relief for the critical housing shortage.

The biggest boost came in August, when Congress passed the McMahon Act, establishing the Atomic Energy Commission and putting atomic energy under civilian control. As 1947 began, the Commission took over and the University of California agreed to continue operating the Laboratory. With the Commission establishing as its first priority "the stabilization and revitalization of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory," it became clear that Los Alamos would continue to play a key role in the Nation's atomic energy program.

Although the Laboratory continued development of advanced fission weapons, it shortly embarked upon its second major mission—development of the hydrogen bomb.

Theoretical possibilities for a thermonuclear weapon, an idea born during a lunchtime discussion in early 1942, had been under study since the earliest days at Los Alamos by a special group headed by Edward Teller. Theoretically, the scientists knew, a fusion reaction was possible, but it required temperatures far higher than any previously created by man. With the success of the fission bomb, these high temperatures had been achieved. The thermonuclear bomb was now in the realm of practical possibility.

But, major barriers were still unmounted. Once the cooperative efforts of Teller and Stanislaw Ulam made the necessary conceptual breakthrough, the Laboratory was able to launch an elaborate theoretical and experimental research program. The famous electronic brain, Maniac, was built to handle the complex calculations of the thermonuclear process, and the Laboratory went on a 6-day week to get the job done. In November 1952, 2 months before the Laboratory's 10th anniversary, the world's first full-scale thermonuclear explosion shook the Pacific atoll of Eniwetok with the detonation of the Los Alamos device, "Mike."

Since that time, several dozen LASL fission and fusion devices have been tested in 8 series of tests in the Pacific and in 8 series, comprising 100 shots, conducted at the Nevada test site. Today, more than 90 percent of all fission and fusion warheads in the U.S. stockpile are Los Alamos products.

During the first decade, as it is today, the Laboratory's primary responsibility was development and improvement of nuclear weapons. However, in view of Bradbury's emphasis on programs of fundamental research and development related to the problems of nuclear energy, it is not surprising that peaceful and fundamental fields of research have received increasing emphasis until today approximately half of the Laboratory's effort is devoted to this type of research.

One nonmilitary project, now the Laboratory's second largest program, is Project Rover, the Nation's effort to develop nuclear rocket propulsion. Since 1955, the Laboratory has concentrated on design, development, and eventually testing of the Kiwi series of reactors. These are named for the flightless Australian bird, because they are not intended to fly. Successful tests of three Kiwi-A and one Kiwi-B reactors, using gaseous hydrogen as a propellant-coolant, began in 1959 and removed doubts about the feasibility of developing nuclear propulsion at all.

This year tests of Kiwi-B reactors using liquid hydrogen as propellant-coolant, will be conducted with the purpose of evaluating and modifying the reactor for use in a rocket engine. During the year, phasing from reactor to engine development is expected in a cooperative effort with contractors in the

Nerva rocket engine program. Nerva's first planned application is as a nuclear third stage for the Saturn C-5 manned lunar landing operation, and will make possible a single launch capability for lunar landing and return. Once engine tests have begun, hopefully sometime next year, Los Alamos' efforts will be shifted to investigations of more advanced propulsion reactors.

The Rover reactor project, however, is only part of a varied reactor research program that began before the Laboratory was a year old. The world's first homogeneous reactor, the Water Boiler, produced its first chain reaction in May 1944, and continues to operate, at higher power, in a deep Los Alamos canyon. Following the Water Boiler came the world's first fast reactor, Clementine, so named because it operated in a cavern in a canyon and used plutonium, whose code word was "49." Clementine operated from 1949 to 1953. Still another research reactor, Omega West, went into low power operation in July 1956.

In the midfifties the Laboratory entered another field of reactor research with the formation of a division to investigate power reactor development. To date, three unique reactor concepts have been tested, and a third experiment is under construction. Also in the works: a fast reactor core test facility in which various fast reactor core designs can be readily interchanged without going to the effort of building an entire reactor for each core.

Another of the Laboratory's major achievements, growing out of its reactor research, was the first direct conversion of nuclear energy into electrical power. Though many scientists had been fascinated by the possibility since the first nuclear pile went critical, it remained for a group of Los Alamos men to come up with the plasma thermocouple. Working on the principle of the conventional two-metal thermocouple, the plasma device substitutes an easily ionized gas for one of the metals. It obtains its heat from the neutron flux of the Omega West reactor. After more than 70 in-pile tests, scientists now are thinking of a power reactor built of many of these cells, producing a high power level and capable of operating for thousands of hours.

Although a practical power reactor probably will not be a reality until sometime in the 1970's, such a device could power the life-supporting facilities man needs in his space ships for extended journeys. It also will put ion propulsion within practical reach.

The harnessing of thermonuclear energy as a cheap, almost inexhaustible source of power was discussed at Los Alamos long before the hydrogen bomb became a reality. Just before the Mike shot in 1952, the first experiments in what is now called Project Sherwood were conducted with a device called perhapeltron—perhaps it would work, perhaps it wouldn't.

It didn't. But the experiments offered enough encouragement to keep the search going and opened up an entirely new field of investigation; plasma physics.

Since no material exists that is capable of withstanding the incredibly high temperatures required to produce a sustained thermonuclear reaction in ionized deuterium gas, the plasma must be confined in the nonmaterial walls of a magnetic field, or "bottle." Trying a variety of approaches to this problem, Los Alamos scientists eventually achieved, with a machine called Scylla, a burst of neutrons showing an energy temperature of 15 million degrees—and fusion. Though recognized around the world as the first manmade controlled thermonuclear reaction, the achievement also showed that there was still a very long way to go. Some 10 years of work with a variety of devices have resulted in some disappointing failures, some promising successes, and always,

an increasing store of knowledge and high hopes.

Aiding and abetting all Laboratory projects is the work of the chemistry and metallurgy division. Chemical and metallurgical investigations of reactor materials, and the development of new fabrication techniques, are of prime importance in Project Rover, power reactor work and the plasma thermocouple. Fundamental studies of uranium and transuranium elements have added significantly to the world's knowledge of such materials. A pioneer in the field of plutonium processing, Los Alamos developed an electro-refining process that has been called "the biggest advancement in plutonium process technology in a decade." A batch of plutonium refined by this process has been accepted by the National Bureau of Standards as the Nation's first and only recognized standard of pure metal.

Research in low temperature physics, by the cryogenics group, has produced significant work in measurements of the Mossbauer effect, and in a temperature scale based on the vapor pressure of helium 3 that has been adopted as a worldwide standard.

Biomedical research, a program that grew out of early concern for the amount of plutonium being absorbed by personnel, has become a program of great importance in the Laboratory. The health research group recently completed a 6-year study of radioactivity in milk and in humans, the most extensive project of its kind ever undertaken. This, along with the group's enlightening findings on the harmful effects of radiation, have made Los Alamos scientists among the foremost authorities on fallout in the world.

All of the Laboratory's practical programs are supported by basic and independent research. The history of the Laboratory affords dozens of examples of original research projects which have resulted in unique contributions to mankind's knowledge of the physical universe. To accomplish this, the Laboratory is well equipped with research tools. In addition to two research reactors and many critical assemblies, Los Alamos has one of the world's highest voltage electrostatic accelerators, two smaller ones, a variable energy cyclotron, a Cockcroft-Walton accelerator and various betatrons. A 350-kilovolt pulsed neutron generator will be in operation soon, and a tandem Van de Graff generator is being purchased.

Theoretical studies at Los Alamos ranged widely during the first 20 years. The weapons program depended heavily on theoretical work—and still does. In addition, Lasl theoreticians have been active in many peaceful areas of research, from nuclear structure to astrophysics. Much of the complex work, both theoretical and experimental, is made possible by the Laboratory's unique array of fast computers. In fact, the Laboratory boasts the world's largest computer center.

Maniac I, first of the stored program parallel electronic computers, was designed and built at Los Alamos and went to work in 1952. Seven years later, it was replaced by Maniac II. In addition, the Laboratory has an IBM 704, two 7090's and the supercomputer, "Stretch," developed for the Laboratory by IBM.

In the last 20 years, while the Laboratory was making notable scientific advances, the community of Los Alamos itself was coming of age.

The AEC brought to Los Alamos—in the late 1940's—an ambitious, \$121 million plan for community expansion and laboratory relocation which put new, modern technical facilities on neighboring mesas, removing the unsightly old wooden structures—and their high fences—from the town's main street. A spacious, attractively landscaped shopping and community center was added. Schools and housing were built in the frantic effort to keep up with the need. A post office, library and medical center were added.

Mr. STRATTON. I have a rather long speech and it might, perhaps, be better for us to get in the discussion after I have had a chance to get it in the Record.

Let me say that the reference to the photography gap was a statement directly from the committee report that they looked into the charge of a photography gap, and I am sure the gentleman recalls when this was made, and it made big headlines, they looked into it and found that the charges were unfounded.

Mr. MORSE. Between what dates?

Mr. STRATTON. Between September 5 and October 14.

Mr. MORSE. If the gentleman will yield further, is it not a fact that there was no aerial reconnaissance surveillance of Cuba, during that period of time?

Mr. STRATTON. No, that is not a fact. The report—and I invite the gentleman's attention to it—lists the extent of the coverage and backs up the statement which it made and which I am quoting, that there was no gap between September 5 and October 14.

Mr. MORSE. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, here are some other points the report makes, in its own wording:

The intelligence chiefs do not believe that the Communist forces in Cuba now present a direct aggressive military threat to the United States or Latin America.

Offensive weapons systems were identified before becoming operational and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out in a limited period of time despite adverse weather and an almost completely closed society.

Photographic reconnaissance ultimately produced incontrovertible proof of the presence of strategic missiles and offensive weapons in Cuba. Credit is due to those involved in this mission.

It has already been indicated, during all of this period there was a great volume of unconfirmed reports and rumors from human sources about strategic missile-related activity in Cuba. None of these reports were confirmed prior to October 14, 1962.

And again, on this same subject, which incidentally lies at the very heart of the attacks which have been mounted against our intelligence performance.

During the July-August period refugee reports of alleged missile activity in Cuba increased significantly. These reports were checked out as scrupulously as possible, but even though many of them included consistent and similar descriptions of some form of missile activity there was no confirmation of them.

We have been reading a lot, Mr. Speaker, about those who had information before the President of the United States went on television on the 22d of October and how those who had this information were right and how the Government was wrong. Here a direct reading of the Senate document, which has not received the attention it deserves in the press, completely and totally refutes that kind of a charge.

The MRBM's were discovered while they were in the process of being deployed. The IRBM sites were discovered in a very early stage of construction. The IL-28 bombers

were discovered while they were still in their crates. The Mig 21's were discovered when only one had been removed from the shipping container.

CIA and military intelligence, by use of their highly developed photographic capability, were able to give a unique performance in intelligence operations. They ultimately placed in the hands of the President, his advisers and U.S. diplomatic representatives incontrovertible proof of the presence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba in direct contravention of Soviet Government assurances. This visual proof unquestionably played a major part in the united action of the OAS and world acceptance of the correctness of our position.

The intelligence community does not believe that in fact Cuba is now or has been a base for Soviet submarines.

Now, Mr. Speaker, I have here listed 11 specific points, in the language of the report itself, which I think are responsive to some of the charges we have all been reading in the press. These are the hard, demonstrated facts about our Cuban intelligence found by the subcommittee. They add up, in my judgment, to a simply overwhelming confirmation of an outstanding job done by our intelligence agencies in the Cuban crisis. And they conclusively refute and, indeed, demolish, Mr. Speaker, all the myriad charges we have heard raised on this floor and in another body about what was really going on in Cuba, or what was really known to someone with some specialized brand of "inside intelligence dope."

I think this is a tremendous verdict to be handed down by any jury, Mr. Speaker, and surely it should have demolished once and for all the nit-picking attacks that have been made variously on the competency and integrity of our Nation's intelligence services. Not only should these facts wipe out completely all of these efforts to cast doubt and suspicion on the performance of our intelligence agencies, surely they should give us a great sense of pride, both in the performance of our intelligence people and in the conduct of our Government leaders acting on the basis of that intelligence information.

Yet, Mr. Speaker, and this is the thing that disturbs me, and it is the reason why I have taken this time today, having clearly acquitted the defendant on the basis of the factual evidence, the subcommittee jury, by some strange legislative alchemy, then proceeds to find him guilty not on the basis of the facts but on guesswork. Let us take a closer look at this strange turn of events in the subcommittee report.

First. Having discarded the charge about missiles being hidden in caves, by saying that the intelligence chiefs "to a man" did not believe it, the subcommittee goes on to add:

However, they readily admit that, in terms of absolutes, it is quite possible that offensive weapons remain on the island concealed in caves or otherwise * * * based on skepticism, if nothing more, there is reason for grave concern about this matter.

What a strange statement, Mr. Speaker, that is. Anything, of course, is always possible. But are we living in a real world or are we living in a dream world? Do we act on the basis of facts

and evidence, or on the basis only of philosophical skepticism? Do we make our decisions on reality, or in terms of absolutes which can have no application to our real world?

Are we now suddenly to discard the reasoned, rational, realistic beliefs of every single one of our intelligence chiefs and to fall back instead on some appeal to absolutes and "nothing more" than philosophical skepticism as the touchstone of truth and falsity when it comes to Cuba? We certainly do not operate this way in any other agency of government; we do not operate this way in the business world; we most certainly do not operate on that basis in our everyday lives. Then why should we now suddenly be told that such an approach is a meaningful factor in assessing our Government's conduct in the Cuban crisis?

Or consider this statement in the report:

The deficiency in the performance of the intelligence community appears to have been in the evaluation and assessment of the accumulated data. Moreover there seems to have been a disinclination on the part of the intelligence community to accept and believe the ominous portent of the information which had been gathered.

And again:

It was not until the photographic evidence was obtained on October 14 that the intelligence community concluded that strategic missiles had been introduced into Cuba.

Mr. MacGREGOR. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. MacGREGOR. In connection with the point the gentleman made as to the verification of ballistics missiles in Cuba on October 14 for the first time, I would like to inquire whether the gentleman was in the House of Representatives on September 26, 1962—and I am quoting the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, page 19719—when the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS] advised the House as follows:

We have arrived, Mr. Chairman, at the point where we had better march together while time remains.

I got a lot of information over the 22 years I have been on the military committee, and I have other assignments from which I get information. They are loaded for bear in Cuba. Russia has missiles, and they are portable ones that can permeate the United States—and they are portable—from Havana, Cuba, to Norfolk, Va. And this is not idle talk.

Was the gentleman in the Chamber on September 26, 1962, some 3 weeks in advance of October 14, 1962, when the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS] made that statement without, I may add, any refutation whatsoever?

Mr. STRATTON. The gentleman knows I cannot recall specifically whether I was in the Chamber on a particular day.

Mr. MacGREGOR. This was during the debate on the Cuba resolution, and I assume the gentleman was here.

Mr. STRATTON. I know I was there that day, and was proud to vote for the

resolution. I do not recall the gentleman's statement being made. I have no doubt it was made.

Mr. MacGREGOR. I assure the gentleman that I have correctly quoted Mr. RIVERS' statement.

Mr. STRATTON. I would not take issue at all with what the distinguished ranking member of our committee said. I simply point out to the gentleman that what applies to the gentleman from South Carolina applies to the distinguished Member of the other body, with whom I have upon occasion taken exception with regard to this same point; namely, that there were a lot of rumors and reports of strategic missiles and of short-range missiles in Cuba prior to October 14. The point I am making is the point made by me in this body before, and now has been demonstrated and proven by the report of a subcommittee of the other body; namely, that until October 14 there was no proof, no confirmation of this charge. It is one thing to talk about rumors, and it is another thing to talk about proven fact. When you are going to take this country to the brink of nuclear war, as the President did on October 22, you had better be very sure that what you are talking about is a fact and not a rumor.

Mr. MacGREGOR. I have served, like the gentleman, in the intelligence branch of our military services. Would the gentleman not agree with the distinguished subcommittee of the other body that intelligence coming from a closed society covers a certain range of factual information, and the principal problem is proper evaluation and analysis.

Mr. STRATTON. I certainly would agree with the gentleman on that point. If the gentleman will bear with me a moment, he will see I am now moving into a discussion of this specific point. I am sure that after the gentleman has heard what I have to say, because of his background in the intelligence field and his own native sound intelligence, he will agree wholeheartedly with the statement I am about to make.

Mr. MacGREGOR. I await the gentleman's further remarks with bated breath.

Mr. STRATTON. I thank the gentleman.

Resuming the direct quotation from the subcommittee report on this second major critique which they make of our intelligence performance in the Cuban crisis:

It was not until the photographic evidence was obtained on October 14 that the intelligence community concluded that strategic missiles had been introduced into Cuba. In reaching their pre-October 14 negative judgment the intelligence analysts were strongly influenced by their judgment as to Soviet policy, and indications that strategic missiles were being installed were not given proper weight by the intelligence community.

Now, Mr. Speaker, I regret to say that this statement simply makes no sense to me. The report itself has already stated, as I mentioned just a moment ago, that until the U-2 flight of October 14 there was not a single bit of confirmation of

the human reports that strategic missiles had been placed in Cuba, even though they were most scrupulously checked out by our intelligence personnel. Are we now being asked to criticize our intelligence people because they did not conclude that strategic missiles were in Cuba before they had any confirmation of these rumors in their hands? What does the subcommittee think our intelligence chiefs should base their judgments on—confirmed fact, or fiction? Before October 14 the record itself says there was absolutely no confirmed proof of Soviet strategic missiles at hand. Our intelligence agencies would have been derelict indeed had they made any such conclusion then before the October 14 date. But we also know that as soon as the October 14 evidence was in, they immediately made the correct conclusion, and they passed it on swiftly to the President, and he in turn acted swiftly, courageously, and effectively. Does the subcommittee really think our intelligence agencies are open to reprimand because they failed to manifest psychic powers prior to October 14?

Again, the report says this:

Finally, the intelligence community was of the opinion that the Soviets would not introduce strategic missiles into Cuba because they believed that such a development would be incompatible with Soviet policy as interpreted by them.

Well, this may well have applied to some or even many in the intelligence community, but it emphatically does not apply to the chief of that intelligence community, Mr. John McCone, as the distinguished Senator from Washington, Mr. JACKSON, makes clear on page 7733 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for May 9, the day the text of the report was made available to the other body.

The subcommittee report goes on:

The danger that such preconceptions will control the weighting of the facts as events unfold is evident.

And again:

It appears that on this point [about strategic missiles] the analysts were strongly influenced by their philosophical judgment that it would be contrary to Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba. In retrospect, it appears that the indicators to the contrary were not given proper weight.

Now, Mr. Speaker, this statement too makes no sense to me. I am sorry to say, the subcommittee's own report has made it crystal clear that whatever may have been the erroneous preconceptions and philosophical judgments of certain analysts within the intelligence community, they had not the slightest control or influence over the weighting of the facts, because from the very moment the reports of strategic missiles in Cuba came in, the Government did everything within its power to determine the truth of these reports. Checked them out, as the subcommittee itself commented, "scrupulously." That is a pretty strong word, Mr. Speaker. What more could it have possibly done? Whatever erroneous philosophical judgments there may have been, they had absolutely no impact on our actions. We were not lulled asleep, as at Pearl Harbor. We did not refuse to

check out all the evidence as at Pearl Harbor. Instead we did a fantastically thorough intelligence job that got results as quickly as humanly possible, even though those results proved to be contrary to the philosophical preconceptions of some people; and then finally we accepted that confirmed proof, and we acted on it the moment it was received—as the subcommittee's factual findings also indicate. What a vast—and most fortunate difference—from what happened in the days before Pearl Harbor.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, we are told that the intelligence community erred by substantially underestimating Soviet troop strength in Cuba. Now let me make just two comments on this particular alleged error.

In the first place, there can be no other basis for determining Soviet manpower in Cuba except our own intelligence estimates. If our intelligence agencies can be said to have underestimated Soviet manpower this can only be so because they have now, on the basis of further information, come up with a new estimate. There is no other benchmark short perhaps of direct Soviet and Cuban announcements, Mr. Speaker, by which to measure real Soviet strength in Cuba, or an on-the-spot head count on Cuban soil. So to criticize the performance of our intelligence reports on the basis of other updated intelligence reports made by the same agency strikes me as an exercise in futility.

Secondly, the subcommittee appears to be laboring here, as before, under a misapprehension that intelligence cannot be good unless it is absolutely certain and 100 percent correct. Now nothing could possibly be further from the truth than that. Intelligence of the enemy must by its very nature be inexact, an attempt at approximating a truth that is deliberately and ingeniously being concealed from us. To criticize intelligence, even softly, simply because it is not accurate is to retreat once more into an unrealistic dream world of absolutes that bears no relation to reality itself. To insist that our intelligence services must have nothing but perfect scores would be like insisting on an airplane flying without the wing drag—without which sustained flight itself, of course, would be impossible—it just cannot in the nature of the case be done.

Now, Mr. Speaker, on the basis of this analysis, I think it should now be clear that as far as the facts developed by the distinguished subcommittee of the other body are concerned, the record of our intelligence services during the Cuban crisis, far from being open to doubt, suspicion or attack, is nothing short of phenomenal. The discovery of the strategic missile sites in Cuba was a major intelligence victory—and one which has been almost as much overlooked and deprecated in recent days as the military and diplomatic victory which was won by President Kennedy between October 22 and October 28.

Only when we leave the realm of facts behind, Mr. Speaker, and retreat into another world of absolutes and unattainable perfection can there be any basis for criticizing the performance of

our intelligence agencies in Cuba or for suggesting that the attacks which have been made against them have any real merit whatsoever.

I deeply regret, Mr. Speaker, that there has been this strange blend of fact and fancy. On the facts the committee developed there certainly could have been and I believe there should have been, a clear, forthright, unmistakable, and conclusive rejection of all these unwarranted and irresponsible attacks that have been made against our intelligence agencies. The facts were there. The call could and should have been given, loud and clear.

Instead, Mr. Speaker, the trumpet has given forth an uncertain sound. Those who in months past have gained fame and notoriety by the suppositions they have tried to create about the performance of our intelligence agencies have unfortunately been given aid and comfort by the inconclusive nature of this report. Indeed, already they are citing the subcommittee document as proof of all their earlier charges.

But there remains one ray of hope, Mr. Speaker. This report is after all an interim report. Others, we are told, will be issued later on. I am indeed hopeful that when the final report is in, these curious contradictions will have been eliminated.

Unanimity is a great thing, Mr. Speaker. But let me say that I am hopeful that if the final report on this vital issue cannot come down unanimously solidly behind the ability and integrity of our intelligence services in the Cuban crisis, at least we will have a minority report to read which will state the record without hesitation or apology, as one chapter in American military history of which we can all be proud.

FOREIGN TRAVEL EXPENSES OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS SHOULD BE LIMITED

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. HALPERN] is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to congratulate the Members of this House for approving legislation that, upon enactment, would restrict foreign travel expenses of Members of Congress. The legislation is, of course, House Joint Resolution 245.

I feel strongly about this legislation and I trust it will win overwhelming support in the other body. My only regret is that the measure did not come before the House in the original, stronger and broader version as introduced by the distinguished chairman of the Committee on House Administration, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BURLISON]. However, the legislation as passed by the House is a long step forward and I hope the first of many steps to follow.

It is true that the House Rules Committee during this Congress has tightened authorizations for matters pertaining to congressional travel. It is also true though that the Rules Committee actions do not have the permanence of law, and therefore, can be relaxed at will.

It is important therefore that travel reform legislation is enacted. Otherwise, Congress will once again be open to charges of practicing temporary and ineffectual cures, and of neglecting permanent and effective ones, in spite of the Rules Committee's notable efforts.

Commendable as this legislation is, it should be considered as only a first step by Congress in putting its Houses in order. The reform of travel expenditures, after all, is only one of many necessary reforms, few of which have been seriously considered lately by Congress.

The next reform measure that Congress should consider would provide for the examination of all congressional reform proposals. My bill, H.R. 1952, and several similar bills would establish a Commission on the Organization of Congress. I trust that the Rules Committee will give priority to this legislation and afford an early opportunity for hearings on it.

This Commission would recommend legislation that would take up where the Reorganization Act of 1946 and relevant legislation left off. Generally speaking, the Commission would study Federal legislative conditions, and then recommend improvements in the organization and operation of Congress.

The study would be undertaken with a view to altering Congress in the following ways: strengthen it, simplify its operations and make them more efficient, improve its relations with the other branches, and enable Congress better to meet its constitutional responsibilities.

The Commission's studies would include, but not be limited to, the organization and operation of the House and the Senate, and the relations between those two bodies. The Commission would also study the minute workings of Congress, including the structure and workings of all congressional committees and the relations among them, and the employment and pay of congressional employees. Furthermore, the Commission would study the relations between Congress, the executive, and the judiciary.

The Commission would be composed of at least seven Members from each House, with an initial party ratio of 4 to 3, in favor of the majority. These 14 Members would be supplemented by 2 more, with distinguished records of interest in public affairs, and appointed by the President of the United States, regardless of political affiliation.

A majority vote of the Members representing each House, taken separately, would be necessary for approval of Commission recommendations.

The Commission would make available to Congress not only stiffer organizational standards, but also standards of behavior. Standards in the latter regard have been, and continue to be, poorly defined, and as a result have contributed to unfortunate and misleading publicity.

The rules of Congress have been taken for granted at a time when nothing should be taken for granted. If Congress continues to neglect revision of its rules, the work upon public business will become only more haphazard. We

shall be charged with relying on rules that appear to be sound chiefly because Congress has endured, and not because such rules have aided in the dispatch of business.

It would indeed be tragic if Congress would change only when an aroused Nation forced it to change. Force breeds haste, violence, and unsound reform. Therefore let this Congress act not from forced impulse, but rather from seasoned deliberation, in order to provide for the inevitable.

NEW TEST-BAN PROPOSAL

(Mr. FARBSTAIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 10 minutes.)

Mr. FARBSTAIN. Mr. Speaker, on September 26, 1961, President Kennedy affixed his signature to a document. It was not an ordinary document, for it proclaimed to the whole world the desire of the American people to challenge the Soviet Union, not to an arms race but to a peace race. The document which the President signed on that day was the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. This legislation, of which I was a sponsor, received extensive consideration in the Congress and in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, of which it is my privilege to be a member. It passed by an overwhelming bipartisan vote of 73 to 14 in the Senate and 290 to 54 in the House. The purpose of the act was to create the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. By congressional mandate, it was to explore, recommend, and if approved by the President, negotiate possible alternatives to the arms race in order to enhance our national security.

Ever since its establishment, I have closely followed and strongly supported the activities of this Agency for peace. This year I introduced the first of many bills in the House to remove the \$10 million legislative ceiling on appropriations which was contained in the original act. Out of this \$10 million, \$8.33 million has been appropriated to the Agency during the year and a half it has been in existence. By comparison, almost \$50 billion was appropriated to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1963 alone. If the work of the Agency is to continue, and if we are to continue to pursue safeguarded and informed negotiations in the field of arms control and disarmament, the legislative ceiling on appropriations obviously must be lifted.

I admit that I may not be as knowledgeable as some of the experts and technicians who are concerned with working out the details of arms control and disarmament agreements. Perhaps, though, this permits me, as it permits other Americans, to be more objective in my judgments. You have all read and heard about the controversy over whether or not our test-ban proposals are adequately safeguarded. Arguments have raged over whether or not our proposed verification system is adequate to detect Soviet cheating under a test ban.

For the most part, this concern has been directed at possible secret Soviet tests with a magnitude less than one-quarter the size of our first nuclear ex-

plosion in New Mexico almost 20 years ago and less than one ten-thousandths the size of the largest recorded Soviet explosion.

It is the view of the State Department, the Defense Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency that significant Soviet advances would require a series of tests; that the probability is high that any meaningful series would be discovered by seismic or other means; and that such occasional small tests as might evade detection, if the Soviets were prepared to risk getting caught, would not have a damaging impact on the military balance. Weighing the risks of continued unlimited testing against the risks involved in a test-ban treaty, both this administration and the Eisenhower administration concluded that such a treaty would be in our national interest.

Now let me mention just briefly a few of the advantages of a test-ban agreement. It would: First, be a first step toward slowing down the nuclear arms race; second, be a first step toward inhibiting the further development of nuclear capabilities by other countries—a development which would increase the chances of nuclear devastation; third, eliminate the expense of conducting nuclear tests, an expense which is in the hundreds of millions of dollars for each series; fourth, preserve for a longer time our present advantages in nuclear weaponry; and fifth, eliminate radioactive fallout.

Despite these overwhelming advantages, the issue has been beclouded and misunderstood. In addition to the disproportionate and sometimes manufactured fears of Soviet cheating, arguments have also raged over the so-called concessions we have made in the number of annual onsite inspections. These critics ignore the fact that, when the United States was proposing a greater number of annual inspections, we believed there were almost four times more earthquakes annually in the Soviet Union than has proved to be the case. This greatly diminishes the number of natural earthquakes which would be likely to be confused with the tremors caused by nuclear explosions. These opponents of a test ban also ignore the fact that research has given us improved ability through seismic and other means to discriminate at a distance and without inspections, between earthquakes and explosions. If these are "concessions," they are concessions to peace, to the greater security of America and all nations, and to scientific progress.

The President, the Secretary of State and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency have all stated that a test ban agreement would be in treaty form, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate before it could be put in effect. Some Senators in Congress have recently speculated that if the present proposal were submitted to them, the required two-thirds majority would be lacking. One Senator recently suggested, on the basis of a study his staff had made, that the proponents of

a test ban treaty would be lucky to get 57 out of 100 votes. I speak to inquire if the country feels the same way—if American mothers and fathers want to continue to face the prospect of nuclear annihilation for themselves and their children—if they want to face the continuing and ever-increasing threat of radioactive fallout as more and more countries start testing and building up nuclear arsenals of destruction.

In an address before the United Nations on September 25, 1961, the day before the Arms Control and Disarmament Act was signed into law, President Kennedy said:

Today, every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the day when it may no longer be habitable. Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident, miscalculation or madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us.

I do not believe that the estimates for U.S. Senate support of a test ban treaty, if correct, reflect the sentiment of the vast majority of Americans. I say that it is imperative that we make some effort, in however small a measure, to strengthen the slender thread by which the nuclear sword of Damocles hangs. I say we must break the stalemate which again exists at Geneva. Although I am not a military technologist or an expert on seismology, I am an American and a human being. I personally do not believe it is either realistic or in the interest of our national security to let technicalities of comparatively minor import blind and distort a goal which two administrations have concluded to be in our national interest. Over the years the distance between the Soviet and U.S. positions has been narrowed by changes on both sides. Who knows if time and the possibility of a new regime in the Soviet Union will render impossible the goal we so earnestly seek and obliterate forever the frail opportunity that we now have? I say let us make clear evidence of our overwhelming desire to go forward in the cause of peace and security. I say, let us split our divergence down the middle. I say, let us propose an agreement for 1 year with the option of renewing that agreement for longer periods. I say further, let us propose an agreement calling for five effective, meaningful onsite inspections. The Soviets are satisfied to permit two or three inspections only. We have been asking for six or seven inspections. I suggest here a compromise of five meaningful, onsite inspections under a 1-year treaty, with the option of renewal. In this way we could promote the cause of peace, security, and trust, and test the validity of our proposals. Thus we may accomplish the results sought throughout the world by the man in the street—a test ban treaty. Certainly, this may involve taking some chance, but is it comparable with our continuing gamble on international nuclear annihilation? If it is determined that the proposed agreement is found unworkable, we could always return to the uneasy peace presently existing.

As Senator CHURCH of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said at a recent hearing on test ban negotiations:

Practically no attention is given at all—which would permit the people of the United States to put this question in perspective—to the risks that we are taking and continue to take if, somehow, we do not begin to turn this nuclear arms race down.

We are like passengers on a train that is headed toward a terrible precipice, and we know the bridge is out, and yet, we are arguing with one another as to what the dangers are in jumping off the train without taking into account what the inevitable end result will be if we continue on the tracks.

What do I seek? An avenue, an approach to attain a goal which the world seems to be crying out for—a goal that may be just beyond the touch of our fingertips. I am not unmindful of certain disadvantages that may be inherent in my proposal and I would not want it to be put into effect unless our security experts agreed that, on balance, it was in our national interest. However, unless some means is found to break the stalemate, this illusive thing called peace may not be attained in our lifetime—and who knows how long this lifetime might be under present world conditions?

RUSSIAN TRAWLERS IN THE CARIBBEAN

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. ROGERS] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROGERS of Florida. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FASCELL].

(Mr. FASCELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, last March 4 there appeared in the southernmost newspaper of the United States *The Key West Citizen* of Key West, Fla., a news story by Jim Cobb, supported by photographic evidence of a Russian-made fishing boat, the *Omicron 50*, which was reportedly hijacked by its two Cuban crewmen. At this time, as a prelude to the discussion which is about to take place I would like again, Mr. Speaker, to draw my colleagues' attention to this incident and to refresh their memories on the subject.

The headline was: "Russian-Made Fishing Boat Is Brought Here; Hijacked by Cuban Crewmen."

The story follows:

A new 50-foot fishing vessel, identified as Russian-made and reportedly hijacked, docked here yesterday and its two Cuban crewmen were taken into custody by immigration officials.

The vessel—the *Omicron 50*—is believed to be a part of the huge Soviet-backed development program of the Cuban fishing industry announced last October by Premier Fidel Castro.

It arrived under its own power about 8:30 a. m. The two Cubans were immediately whisked off to Miami by immigration authorities. Their identities were not released.

has become more and more complicated. The capital requirements to farm has skyrocketed from an average of \$40,000 to nearly \$60,000 in the last 10 years and it is further estimated this figure will leap to \$90,000 to \$100,000. All of this merely points out the need for more formal training in farming. Where will we be 10, 20, yes, even 50 years from now if we fail to train a fair share of our most talented rural youth for a future in this great occupation of farming.

Perhaps former President Eisenhower has said this better than I can and so I would like to quote our former President from a speech given in 1953. "Our great cities, our mighty industries, our business and professional accomplishments, our educational institutions, our high living standards, are possible because of the efficiency and productivity of the American farm."

Yes, indeed, the need for formal training in vocational agriculture is greater than ever before. Voc-ag can help with this problem of supplying sufficient agricultural leadership.

This can be done if the farm youth, their parents, educators, and others who advise farm youth learn of the great future there can be in agriculture and help point out these possibilities to our farm-reared boys. Vocational agriculture can help the farm youth by giving him instruction in—

1. Establishment in farming or farm training, with practice and study.
2. Leadership.
3. A formal background that will help in employment for farm related occupations.
4. Build a cash reserve that will help for getting started in farming, other business, or pay college expense.
5. Preparation for more advanced training.

I urge you not to sell vocational agriculture short. The latest studies of high school graduates show vocational agriculture graduates hold a decided edge over nonvocational agriculture graduates now engaged in farming. For example, they average larger farms, grown 22 more acres of corn, save more pigs per litter, use more of the newer, more productive methods of farming and average from \$1,500 to \$2,000 more net income than nonvocational agriculture graduates.

When looking for a job actual experience is the best qualification. The first part of our motto points this out: "Learning to do; doing to learn."

Our FFA chapter gives valuable experience in leadership. All members are urged to take part in contests for learning by doing is an important factor in training.

Vocational agriculture can provide training for other occupations besides farming. Each year my adviser receives several phone calls asking for references for such jobs as management in grain elevators, gas stations, and farm corporations. Employers have often stated that vocational agriculture graduates possess skills that are needed for successful management. Local FFA chapter members, at the end of their senior year, had an average net worth of \$2,340 more than other seniors. The cash reserve is possible because of money invested in livestock and farming instead of cars. This cash reserve or increased net worth can be used for an actual start in farming, a business, or pay for part of 1, 2, 3, or even 4 years of college.

Recent studies have shown that vocational agriculture graduates do decidedly better in agriculture college and equally as well in general college as nonvocational agriculture graduates.

Farming is our largest industry. If you want to farm your chances are doubled if 3 years of vocational agriculture are taken. Vocational agriculture teaches leadership, management, farm training, and college preparation. I am sure that there is a future in agriculture for you if you are interested. Make use of your rich heritage of

farm living and fully investigate farming and agriculture before you decide your future. A satisfying, rewarding, and exciting future awaits those who train for a future in agriculture.

Chubasco
Are We Taking Our Eyes Off Cuba?

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. DONALD G. BROTZMAN

OF COLORADO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 16, 1963

Mr. BROTZMAN. Mr. Speaker, the Kennedy administration has sharply curtailed reconnaissance operations in Cuba at a time when we badly need every bit of information obtainable about "what is going on in Cuba?"

The administration's decision to follow this course while negotiating with Khrushchev and Castro is shortsighted and absurd. I commend the editorial from the May 12, 1963, issue of the Denver Post, Denver, Colo., for your reading:

ARE WE TAKING OUR EYES OFF CUBA?

Now what's going on in Cuba? A Miami newspaper reports that U.S. military officers are worried about the appearance of large numbers of Russian tents—some big enough to enclose a missile and its launcher—in Cuba, and heavy transport traffic from areas in Cuba where there are known to be large caves.

What's worse, the Miami Herald reports, the Kennedy administration has so sharply curtailed our intelligence operations that military leaders don't know any details on this latest Soviet activity in Cuba.

There have been no low-level reconnaissance plane flights over Cuba since February 9, the Herald reports; there have been only occasional high-level U-2 plane flights, and U.S. suppression of anti-Castro guerrilla raids has cut off the flow of information from those sources.

Why the outcdown on reconnaissance flights? Because, the Herald reports, President Kennedy is determined that nothing shall be allowed to "rock the boat" while he is attempting to negotiate the Russians out of Cuba.

If so, this is ridiculous. Whether Khrushchev or Castro like it or not, the United States has the strongest kind of right—that of simple self-defense—to keep the closest, most intrusive kind of watch over Soviet activities in Cuba.

Whatever negotiations Kennedy may be carrying on with the Soviets—and there is certainly not the slightest sign that they are productive—they should not be allowed to immobilize our continuous day-by-day inspection of that island so near our shores.

Such inspections, in the light of what happened there starting last July and climaxing October 22, are not only a right, but a duty.

A look at our files shows that on August 3, 1962, the Post carried its first report of Russian troop landings in Cuba. The troops, a Miami radio broadcaster said then, had landed in Cuba late in July; 8 days after Fidel Castro's brother, Raul, returned from a 10-day visit to Moscow.

On August 21, there was another story, this time from official Washington sources, that 14 Soviet ships had docked secretly in Cuba, and unloaded mysterious cargoes at night. Three days later, from another Miami source, came the first report that Soviet personnel were setting up a rocket or missile site in Cuba.

We know now what was going on—those were the first Soviet troops, missiles, and missile-site crews. But "administration specialists in Cuban affairs," the August 21 story said, doubted that those Russians were combat troops—just technicians.

The point is, those administration specialists didn't know what they were talking about, because they didn't have the facts. We were only running two U-2 flights over Cuba monthly in those days, although we did have detailed reports from the Cuban underground.

Now, if the Herald's reports are true, we are back on the two-U-2-flights-per-month schedule. But now we don't even have as good a flow of information from the Cuban underground as we did then, for which this administration may bear some blame, and Castro has just returned from another long visit to Moscow.

This reconnaissance letup is, we repeat, foolish and dangerous. The Soviets being the kind of tricksters they are, it is the administration's first duty to know what is going on in Cuba, no matter what effect intensive reconnaissance may have on any negotiations.

If the Soviets have nothing to hide, they will not object. If they do object, that is proof positive that reconnaissance is essential.

Chubasco
Russian Strength Increasing in Cuba

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. BOB WILSON

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 16, 1963

Mr. BOB WILSON. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Record, I include the following article from the Spokane Spokesman-Review of May 10, 1963:

RUSSIAN STRENGTH INCREASING IN CUBA

Senator KEATING's claim that Russian military strength in Cuba is 10 times greater than it was last July points up a situation apparent in the Federal administration which should be changed immediately.

Officials are constantly releasing information regarding Cuba which either is refuted or challenged to the point where most people have little idea as to the magnitude of the Cuban threat.

This fact was apparent last fall when administration and congressional leaders made comments throughout the Nation that there was no threat of aggressive action from Cuba. Yet, while these comments actually were being said, President Kennedy made his dramatic announcement involving Soviet missiles being installed in Cuba.

Administration leaders have frequently reported that Soviet troops are being withdrawn. But other sources, including Senator KEATING, claim that the actual number on the island has increased.

There may be legitimate reasons why certain information should not be made public. If there is a security risk involved, certainly no one would be critical of such a policy.

But congressional leaders, regardless of political parties, should either be given accurate information or informed that there is sufficient risk so that no statements should be made on the subject.

Reliable sources recently reported the arrival of 6,000 Russian troops in Cuba, quartered in underground barracks. There have been other reports that the original Russian goal was 100,000 troops in the island this year.

KEATING is a frequent critic of Communist infiltration in Latin America and of Democratic policy in Cuba. He may not be as critical if the administration would inform him of all the knowledge they have on the matter. Apparently, the lines of communications in Washington, D.C., are not functioning well.

Until his claim concerning Russian military strength just 90 miles off our coast is officially refuted, however, we must assume that the information he has received on his own is accurate.

Do It Gradually—It Is Far Less Painful

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. GEORGE A. GOODLING

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 16, 1963

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Speaker, when an editor wrote in the March 30 issue of *Baking Industry* he must have, by some super-natural power, predetermined the action of this House, Wednesday, May 15.

The complacent frog was heated gradually in water until he succumbed. Yesterday this House gave the general public more of the same but in gradual steps, hoping to lull it—the public—into complacency so no voice will be raised. To increase the debt ceiling from \$305 to \$307 to \$309 billion appears to be the painless way, but when the full impact of the heat is felt, Mr. and Mrs. Taxpayer will undoubtedly raise a voice in protest that might well reach in the Halls of Congress and reach it should. Let's learn from the lesson of the frog.

The editorial follows:

THE COMPLACENT FROG

If you should ever want to boil a frog alive and make him enjoy the whole thing, just follow this simple advice. Above all else, don't do it all at once. If you drop froggy into a pot of boiling water, naturally he will jump right out.

Instead, place him in a pot of lukewarm water. The unwary frog will find the water more comfortable and probably relax and take a nap. Increase the heat slightly, but not too much. He may wake up, but since the water still is not too hot, he will probably go right back to sleep.

Continue making the heat changes, always making them gradual and pretty soon the water will actually be boiling. You will have boiled the unsuspecting frog without his even knowing it. As a matter of fact, he actually slept through it all, a victim of his own complacency.

There are forces in America today which are raising the temperature of our political and social environment while we sit back not noticing the gradual changes. One day we will wake up to find that we have been "boiled alive" and are living in an environment of Federal control and regulations. When this time comes, we will have nowhere to place the blame except on our own complacency.

Most politicians are well aware of the public's apathy to most governmental and legislative affairs. Just as the frog slept unaware of the changes going on around him, we sleep unaware of the creeping encroachment of federalism and socialism which one day may control our lives and destroy the freedoms which we value so highly.

The lesson of the frog is clear—we must remain alert to the political and economic forces that seek to destroy our freedom. We must let our elected representatives know that we are not asleep and that we will not tolerate the gradual eroding of these freedoms.

The frog could have done something about his plight if he had not been so complacently asleep. How about us? Are we going to be asleep?

Who Manages What?—Editorial

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. THOMAS P. GILL

OF HAWAII

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 16, 1963

Mr. GILL. Mr. Speaker, accepting the principle that it depends on whose ox is being gored, I can understand, but not condone, many of the newspaper editorials which have been written about management of news.

It is indeed refreshing when a newspaper editor is willing to examine the substance of this issue and make his own unmanaged judgment.

On May 13, Mr. George Chaplin, editor of the *Honolulu Advertiser*, wrote an editorial which I think deserves the attention of those people who have been flailing away on this subject.

Under unanimous consent I include the editorial in the Appendix of the Record.

The editorial follows:

WHO MANAGES WHAT?

There was some discussion of "managed news" at the recent editors' convention in Washington and the publishers' convention in New York—but, in every instance, the antidote was the same.

The antidote is the capable, sharp-nosed reporter, possessed of a healthy skepticism and the determination to seek out the facts behind official releases.

Any government—whether city, State, or national—tries to maintain the most favorable image possible. Its news announcements and its answers to questions by the press will always be in this framework.

This is old stuff, as old as the Republic and the whole issue of managed news would never have arisen as emotionally as it did if Assistant Secretary of Defense Sylvester had not put into words what had long been silently acknowledged—that in the most critical emergencies a government will go to the most extreme lengths to create the kind of news it feels is needed to serve its policies.

Some of the most pertinent comment we've seen on this is in a *New Leader* magazine article by George E. Herman, the White House correspondent for CBS.

He calmly notes that news management, always with us, hit no great new low in the Eisenhower administration and has risen "to no great new peak today."

Museums "contain castings of a monolith on which, 5,000 years ago, a Pharaoh published an account of his great victory in a battle which he actually lost."

"Gen. Douglas MacArthur once fired a censor who permitted me to report that American troops had 'retreated' under pressure; the correct word, it turned out, was 'withdrew.'"

"James Hagerty did his best to keep reporters from letting the public know that President Eisenhower had caught more than

his legal limit of trout in a Colorado mountain stream . . ." President Kennedy's activities in the news field, he observes, are "well established."

But Herman says that Kennedy's "'cold,' the fiction which brought him back to the White House during the Cuban crisis, was no worse a deception than the 'stomach trouble' which President Eisenhower's aids already knew to be a heart attack."

"Certainly Kennedy had more right to mislead the Russians over Cuba than Eisenhower did to lie about the U-2 plane (which the United States first maintained was only a weather research vehicle). Cuba presented a clear and present danger of war; the U-2 did not."

The smoke following the recent explosion over news management is rapidly lifting. When it's all gone, Herman feels "perhaps we will find a healthier state of affairs, with newsmen and officials confronting one another with new alertness, each side trying to protect its own interest and guess what sly gamit the other fellow is trying to conceal."

Hon. Jed Johnson

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. VICTOR WICKERSHAM

OF OKLAHOMA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 16, 1963

Mr. WICKERSHAM. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Record, I include the following article from the *Daily Oklahoman* in tribute to former Congressman Jed Johnson:

FORMER STATE CONGRESSMAN JED JOHNSON
DIES AT AGE 74

Jed Johnson, 74, former Oklahoma Sixth District Congressman and a U.S. Customs Court judge since 1947, died in a New York City hospital Wednesday of a heart attack.

He suffered a previous attack Sunday and had been hospitalized since.

Funeral will be in Chickasha at 3 p.m. Saturday in the First Baptist Church, with Brown's Funeral Home in charge of arrangements.

Johnson, a Democrat, served in Congress 20 years. He had maintained a legal residence in Chickasha since moving to New York City to take the court appointment made by former President Truman.

Johnson's life was a colorful one. Although he was a lawyer, he was interested in farming and started a breed of turkeys which now bears his name.

Born in Ellis County, Tex., Johnson came to Oklahoma as a boy in 1888. As a youth, he worked as a rural mail carrier. Later, he was a salesman, then a schoolteacher, and subsequently, a country newspaperman with a string of weekly newspapers.

He was first elected to Congress from the Sixth District in 1926 and served six consecutive terms. Johnson was twice a delegate to the Inter-Parliamentary Union at Geneva, Switzerland, once in 1927 and again in 1929.

Among the champion "go-getters" in Congress, Johnson fought successfully to keep Fort Sill and acquired the Federal reformatory at El Reno for Oklahoma.

Johnson had the distinction of being the first person appointed to the same position by two U.S. Presidents.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt nominated him for the U.S. Custom Court judge ship in 1945. Johnson, who was deeply embroiled at the time in a personal feud with

Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, turned down the nomination to remain on a House appropriations subcommittee of which he was chairman.

In 1947, he was nominated to the same position by President Truman.

Johnson worked his way through the University of Oklahoma Law School and topped off his classes in L'Universite de Clermont, France. After his admission to the Oklahoma bar, he set up an office at Anadarko.

He saw service in France with the AEF during World War I.

From 1919 to 1926, he served as a member of the Oklahoma Senate. He married Beatrice Luginbyhl of Chikasha in 1925.

Johnson is survived by his wife, three daughters, Mrs. Jean Fisk, Norman; Mrs. Joan Stauffer, Tulsa, and Mrs. Janell White, San Francisco; a son, Jed Johnson, Jr., New York City; two brothers, Carroll Johnson, Guthrie, and Dr. L. L. Johnson, Shawnee, and five grandchildren.

Four brothers and a sister preceded him in death.

Cuba file
**From Cuba to Laos: U.S. Foreign Policy
Smacks of Appeasement**

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. E. ROSS ADAIR

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 16, 1963

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Speaker, the following reprint from Barron's is particularly appropriate at this time. It brings into focus weaknesses in our foreign policy from Cuba to Laos and points up again the dangers of appeasement:

**FROM CUBA TO LAOS: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
SMACKS OF APPEASEMENT**

The Kennedy administration, as its most ardent critics must admit, has consistently displayed admirable skill in the use of words. Last week the President himself was in rare rhetorical form. After keeping the Nation in mounting suspense for 36 hours, Mr. Kennedy on Thursday snapped the tension—and sent the stock market skyrocketing—with one of the most adroitly phrased, political pronouncements on record. While remaining firmly opposed to “across-the-board” increases in steel prices, he stated, the powers that be are willing to accept “selective adjustments up or down, as prompted by changes in supply and demand.” The day before the steel crisis, at a ceremony conferring honorary American citizenship upon Sir Winston Churchill, the Chief Executive rose to the occasion no less nobly. In a glowing tribute to his new compatriot, the President said in part: “In the dark days and darker nights when England stood alone, he mobilized the English language and sent it into battle. Whenever and wherever tyranny threatened, he has always championed liberty.”

In saluting the verbal prowess of Sir Winston, the President was speaking not merely as head of state but also as one professional to another. Since taking office John F. Kennedy more than once has sought to rally his countrymen with stirring calls to arms; at times he has succeeded in sounding almost Churchillian. Unfortunately, however, the resemblance ends right there. For in translating words into deeds, the Kennedy administration has acted not with the boldness of the great Prime Minister, but with the irresolution and timidity of his inglorious predecessor.

In Latin America, southeast Asia, and in the heart of Europe, the White House, despite an occasional flash of spirit, has been pursuing a policy of appeasement. Day by day and step by step, in consequence, the Communist tyranny has gained ground; the forces of freedom, contrariwise, have been in steady retreat. In a desperate quest for “peace in our time,” as the author of “Why England Slept” must know, Neville Chamberlain unwittingly paved the way for World War II. To prevent history from writing a catastrophic sequel, the President and his official family would do well to learn from it.

A prerequisite to learning, of course, is the willingness to face facts. On this score the White House and its advisers have proved sadly deficient. A case in point is Walt W. Rostow, a man whose global knowledge of economic and political affairs is matched only by his apparent lack of insight. In a far-ranging speech in Philadelphia recently on the cold war, Professor Rostow (who serves as Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State) reported progress on all fronts. To be sure, he conceded, “none of the crises on the national agenda as of January 1961 has been finally and satisfactorily settled. The treaty arrangements in Laos remain precarious, still violated by the continued presence in that country of Vietnamese units under the control of Hanoi. . . . West Berlin stands firm, confident and prosperous, but the threat to its future remains. And evidently the crisis over Cuba is not at an end.” Nonetheless, in a stunning non-sequitur he proceeded to conclude: “We have achieved something substantial in these 26 months: the momentum of Khrushchev's post-Sputnik offensive has been halted, and in the vast areas which have been threatened by it free men breathe easier.”

More dangerous nonsense would be hard to come by these days. Under the hapless leadership of the New Frontier, as even its staunch supporters now concede, the free world has suffered a dreary succession of defeats. Regarding Cuba, for example, William V. Shannon, Washington columnist for the leftwing New York Post, recently pulled no punches. Two years ago, he observed last week, “a brave and active underground movement against Castro was spreading. Exiles in Florida were alive with hope for his early overthrow.” Since then, however, their hopes have been dashed by one betrayal after another, from the Bay of Pigs to the incredible blockade imposed by the U.S. Coast Guard, not against the Communist regime in Havana, but against its mortal foes. Such perfidy now has led to the rupture of friendly ties between Washington and the Cubans in exile, a denouement which, wrote Mr. Shannon scathingly, “Brings to a close a cycle of defeat, political ignorance and moral confusion. Everything has now been surrendered, including honor.”

In Laos, too, the once-firm U.S. posture has developed a perilous sag. Until 1961 this country actively supported a regime in Vientiane which, despite its defects, was pro-Western and willing to resist the thrust of Communist aggression, launched years before by native Reds aided and abetted by North Vietnam and Red China. However, in the ill-founded hope of restoring peace to the embattled land, the Kennedy administration, through its roving Ambassador, W. Averell Harriman, began urging—and finally pressuring—its Laotian allies to form a coalition government with a neutralist group and the local Communist Pathet Lao. Last summer at an international conference the three factions signed an agreement which established such a troika government and demanded the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Laotian soil.

Describing the settlement as a calculated risk (Barron's chose at the time to call it a

witless gamble), Washington promptly complied. The Reds did not. On the contrary, they quickly set about demonstrating once again that every treaty with a Communist is an open invitation to trouble. The Pathet Lao first tried assassination—one of the trusted lieutenants of Kong Le, the misguided neutralist who originally launched the revolt, was murdered a few weeks ago. Next came subversion, a tactic revealed last month when a loyal Laotian soldier shot the Foreign Minister and denounced him as a traitor. Finally, in early April the Pathet Lao launched an unprovoked attack against the neutralist forces on the Plaine des Jarres, capturing several strongholds and other strategic real estate.

To the latest outburst of naked Communist aggression, the New Frontier reacted with its customary vigor. Even as his diplomatic handiwork was collapsing, Averell Harriman was promoted to Under Secretary of State. His boss, Dean Rusk, appealed for a cease fire. And the SEATO Alliance, at United States behest, announced plans to stage an impressive show of force, not in Laos, where the shooting happens to be, but in neighboring Thailand, where free men (Mr. Rostow to the contrary notwithstanding) today surely breathe no easier.

“Don't worry, they're still 90 miles away,” proclaims a satiric Republican car sticker. Evidently Washington hasn't gotten the message. Even as fighting broke out afresh in Laos, the White House was recording its elation over another dubious diplomatic stroke, the tentative agreement to set up a direct line to the Kremlin. Even as President Kennedy was eloquently hailing a now-retired champion of freedom, the cause of freedom was suffering. Appeasement is an ugly word, and one which even Nelson Rockefeller, who sounds more like a party standard-bearer every day, backed away from last week. History has no such qualms. Unless the current disastrous course of events is reversed, there will be only one place in history for the Kennedy administration. And it won't be among the profiles in courage.

Maryland University Given Data System

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. RICHARD E. LANKFORD

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 2, 1963

Mr. LANKFORD. Mr. Speaker, it gives me great pleasure to announce that the University of Maryland Computer Science Center has recently acquired an IBM computer system valued commercially at \$3 million. The computer system is described as an all-transistorized computer with a high speed memory capacity of 32,768 words. The on-line equipment consists of a card reader, a card punch, a printer and 10 magnetic tape drives attached to two input-output channels.

The installation, known as the IBM 7090/1401 computer system, was made available under the IBM educational allowance program. Part of the research of this outstanding center is supported by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Federal grants and contracts awarded to individual departments of the University for computer-related research provides other support.

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

Departments of the university who will utilize the new system include physics and astronomy, psychology, sociology, speech, animal and dairy sciences, and the school of medicine. The ultimate goal of the Science Center is to establish an educational program, with concepts and computer applications being integrated into existing courses.

This fine center, located in College Park, was established in February of 1962 and is under the direction of Werner C. Rheinboldt and his assistant director, John P. Menard. Twenty administrative programming and operating personnel complete the staff.

Government-Run Lotteries of Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. PAUL A. FINO

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 16, 1963

Mr. FINO. Mr. Speaker, while we in the United States continue to wear blinders and stubbornly refuse to accept the obvious, most of the civilized countries throughout the world recognize the wisdom of a national lottery.

Out of all the countries with which we maintain diplomatic relations, 77 of them utilize a government lottery not only as a compromise with the gambling problem but as a revenue-raising device as well.

All 77 countries have found that restraining rather than prohibitive measures are best, as with most other moral legislation.

Today, I would like to point out three countries in Latin America which utilize government-run lotteries as the best possible revenue-producers.

Argentina, in 1962, took in over \$39 million. The government's profit came to \$17 million which was used for emergency medical centers, for the underprivileged, for construction of the San Martin General hospital and for other public works and social programs.

Bolivia, last year, sold almost \$870,000 worth of lottery tickets. The net income to the government was about \$128,000 which was used for the Red Cross, public health and welfare programs, and for mental health institutions.

Brazil, in 1962, the gross annual receipts amounted to \$5,356,000. After payment of prizes which represented 70 percent of the receipts, the balance of over one-half million dollars was earmarked for municipal projects such as water supply and sewer projects and the building of schools, hospitals and housing.

Mr. Speaker, if we opened our eyes and followed the example of these countries as well as the example set by New Hampshire, we could easily, painlessly and voluntarily pump into our U.S. Treasury over \$10 billion a year in much needed revenue. If we had the courage

to capitalize on our own people's gambling thirst, we could raise over \$10 billion a year which could be used to cut our taxes and reduce our national debt. What is wrong with us?

Talk Instead of Test

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. WILLIAM FITTS RYAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 16, 1963

Mr. RYAN of New York. Mr. Speaker, yesterday the New York Times in an editorial approved of the cancellation by the United States of three small nuclear tests which were scheduled for later this month. The editorial points out the minimal scientific significance of the tests. The effect of these tests would have been further to undermine the effort to achieve a test ban agreement and to stimulate a new round of nuclear testing with more contamination of the atmosphere.

Mr. Speaker, the nuclear test ban talks must continue. As the editorial points out, "the stakes are too high for either side to let the talks end in failure." It often requires years of prolonged negotiation before an agreement can be reached between major world powers. The road to disarmament under effective international control will be rocky, but it must be traveled if mankind is to survive.

The New York Times editorial follows:

SAVING THE TEST-BAN TALKS

In another move to save the 5-year-old nuclear test-ban talks from collapse and avert another East-West testing race, the United States has now canceled the three minor tests it had scheduled for later this month. This is a wise and welcome decision.

In fact, considering President Kennedy's determined efforts to reach a test-ban agreement, the scheduling of the tests in the first place poses a mystery. It may be explicable as a compromise in the infighting now going on in Washington between the proponents and opponents of new tests. For the beneficial scientific value of the tests could be only minimal, but their adverse political and psychological effect was bound to be great.

As might have been foreseen, the U.S.S.R. promptly pounced on the tests to accuse the United States of starting a new round in the nuclear arms race. The Soviets threatened to retaliate with a massive test series of their own, which they are suspected of already preparing. The cancellation of our tests deprives them of any propagandistic pretext for resuming theirs.

But cancellation is not enough. Even more determined efforts are necessary to break the present deadlock. President Kennedy has found new and powerful support in such an effort from 27 distinguished scientists, including three Nobel laureates. They have issued an appeal to Congress and the public to back a test-ban treaty as being in the best interests of the United States and of world peace. They urge, as does this newspaper, that the risk of continuing the arms race without a test-ban treaty is considerably greater than the risk that a ban might be violated by secret testing. For such a treaty would stop immediately all

aboveground tests, and though some uncertainty might remain regarding underground tests, these have been found of lesser military value. Detection techniques are already such as to make it too risky for the Soviets to cheat. The treaty might not last, but as long as it lasts, it would leave our nuclear deterrent capacity intact, reduce the speed of the armaments race, help to inhibit the spread of nuclear arms, reduce the likelihood of nuclear war, and prevent further lethal fallout.

Other scientists, of course, and most military men disagree, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They argue that further tests are necessary to perfect our defensive weapons, in particular, an antimissile missile in which a Russian breakthrough could neutralize our whole nuclear arsenal. Also the Russians must still clarify the methods of the three inspections they are ready to admit. Many issues are still to be resolved, but the stakes are too high for either side to let the talks end in failure.

Man Overboard

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. BOB WILSON

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 16, 1963

Mr. BOB WILSON. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the Record, I include the following article from the News of May 14:

MAN OVERBOARD

(By Henry J. Taylor)

Nearly 6 years before his retirement age, America loses a first-class, highly trained, forthright fighting man in the head-chop of Adm. George W. Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations.

In government there are always ways of disagreeing with your boss, most of them dangerous. In the armed services Congress makes the problem an agony—sometimes tragic—as the pitfall eliminating the lifetime career of fine officers. The Nation is the loser; our enemies the gainer. Yet what can an honorable man do?

Admiral Anderson was helpless when the Senate subcommittee ordered him to testify in the Boeing-General Dynamics plane dispute. A man like this will always put his view of the national interest first. And Admiral Anderson's testimony, unavoidably, contradicted many of Defense Secretary McNamara's statements; politely but with the respected weight of proved competence and long experience.

Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis E. LeMay's expert testimony likewise contradicted the boss. Whatever the reasons, his reappointment is cut to 1 year. But Admiral Anderson was tossed entirely out.

A key factor in the present action is Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. As one result, the next question mark is Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff. A House Appropriations Subcommittee ordered him to testify on the Nation's ability to withstand a Soviet ground assault.

Along with Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Walt W. Rostow, etc., Mr. Nitze is one of our leading assurance-mongers. He is likewise as innocent of military experience as Ferdinand the Bull. But he had followed the fashion by blandly announcing a "myth."

He stated: "It is a myth that the Soviet has overwhelming nonnuclear superiority